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Why has the left failed to benefit from the post-2008 economic crisis? This has been a common 
refrain in recent years, but is perhaps an unfair question. It is difficult to see any one political 
family as a unique beneficiary, and indeed the right’s apparent earlier ideological hegemony has 
become increasingly unstuck with the ‘austerity medicine’ having consistently failed to revive the 
European patient in the manner and time-scale promised. Nevertheless, the victory of the radical 
left Syriza party in the February 2015 elections remains very much exceptional, and in the short 
term is unlikely to be repeated elsewhere in Europe (except perhaps Spain). So, it is still 
remarkable that socio-economic conditions providing a ‘perfect storm’ for left-wing politics have 
regularly failed to produce anything like a clear boon for the left.  
 This paper aims to contribute to answering this overarching question by comparing the 
policy and ideological response to the crisis undertaken by the three ‘left’ transnational party 
federations (TNPs) at European level, the Party of European Socialists (PES), European Green 
Party (EGP) and European Left Party (EL).2 Comparing the three TNPs is an apposite approach. 
Although TNPs are ‘timidly rising actors’, relatively weak formations that fall far short of being 
fully integrated parties, they at the very least aspire to a minimal level of ideological and policy 
co-ordination (Bardi 2004; cf. Hanley 2008). In short, if there is any EU-wide consensus over the 
crisis and how to respond to it within a party family, the TNP level is where we might expect to 
see it reflected most clearly.  
 Nevertheless, although the crisis has international and European, as well as purely 
national roots, no TNP (including the traditionally most federalist European People’s Party – 
EPP) has traditionally consistently emphasised supranational, rather than simply 
intergovernmental policy solutions. So expecting a consistent policy response from any party to 
the international crisis may be premature. In addition, the simple fact that there are three separate 
‘left’ European TNPs itself provides a partial answer to the original question. This division shows 
in organisational form the disaggregation of the left since its pre-1970s heyday. We might 
reasonably expect that these three organisations are more likely to be competitive than collusive 
and thereby further the dilution and diminution of left strength at European level rather that to 
offer more than the sum of their parts.  
 Be that as it may, we might usefully use the TNPs to identify some of the main strengths 
and weaknesses of the left policy response and ask whether/how the crisis has changed these 
main features? Is there any renewed convergence between the TNPs either in policy or ideology? 
To what degree is there any coherent response to the crisis emerging? To what degree do the 
‘Eurosceptic’ positions traditionally associated with the radical left find any resonance among 
other left-wing TNPs? 
 The following analysis starts with an overview of the institutional and ideological 
development of these parties as TNPs: the main similarities/differences in their structure and 
performance, relationship to and influence within European institutions. In the second half of the 
paper it discusses the question of the emergence of coherent TNP programmatic positions. While 
space precludes detailed discussion of TNP stances, emphasis will be put on the degree to which 
they share ideological and policy proclivities and the prospects (if any) for policy co-operation 
and convergence post-crisis. 
 Comparison will highlight many similarities between these TNPs: for instance, they 
struggle with similar conflicts between intergovernmentalism and federalism, similar hesitations 
over the development of true transnational parties, and similar constraints over their ability to 
develop genuinely ‘European’ policies and to influence European politics effectively. The Greens 
and EL in particular have many similarities in terms of having expressed aspirations to defend 
their radical, outsider credentials, and not to be absorbed within the EU mainstream. However, 
each TNP has resolved these tensions in different ways. The chief difference between the PES, 
EGP and EL is that in the former two (especially the EGP), these conflicts have gradually 
diminished and a broad consensus over party goals has been reached, allowing a consolidation of 
the TNP. This cannot yet be said of the EL, which remains more internally divided and inchoate.  
 2 
 Nevertheless, despite their very different organisational pedigrees, a policy consensus has 
indeed emerged. All of the three TNPs now claim to oppose neo-liberalism, aspire to a more 
socially just and ecological alternative and share a number of similar proposals. Be that as it may, 
this apparent uniformity in general aspirations has so far provided few concrete results and goes 
little beyond a lowest-common-denominator anti-neo-liberalism that does not necessarily imply a 
detailed symphony of legislative positions, still less a coherent ‘Eurosceptic’ position, even 
among the radical left. Indeed, anti-neo-liberalism is prone to a range of interpretations and 
policy prescriptions among and between the left-wing TNPs. Deeply held ideological and 
organisational cleavages among the left have been elided but are far from eroded, not least 
because of continuing disagreements within the party families themselves. Accordingly, this 
analysis places in stark relief one of the key weaknesses of the left response to crisis – the failure 
to set out a coherent vision universally shared among its adherents.  
 
The PES – pragmatic intergovernmentalism 
 
The PES has its origins in the Liaison Bureau of the Socialist Parties of the European Community 
(established in 1957 to co-ordinate Socialist International member parties operating within the 
EC member states), and later the Confederation of Socialist Parties of the EC (CSPEC), formed 
in 1974 to foster greater co-operation in advance of the first direct EP elections in 1979. Both of 
these organisations had cadre-like tendencies: they were able to promote relatively high 
programmatic unity amongst the half-dozen core member parties, but had little ability to 
influence the broader programmes of non-aligned parties, including the British Labour Party, 
which initially did not join the CSPEC as a full member (Hanley 2008, 66; Hix and Lesse 2002). 
Indeed, despite a very general manifesto being produced for the 1979 elections, the CSPEC had a 
largely ephemeral existence: the great ideological variance of European social democratic parties 
prevented aspirations towards a common European project in the 1980s, and many parties opted 
out or simply ignored its activity (Ladrech 2000, 93).  
 Europe was one of the key divisions among social democratic parties to be sure, but, 
unlike the radical left, it cannot be said that the social democrats put forward consistent 
ideological critiques of the then-EEC. For one thing, despite occasional criticism of neo-
liberalism, since the 1950s no social democratic party can be regarded as substantively anti-
capitalist (Sassoon 2010, 243). Moreover, the ideological logic of post-war democratic socialism 
argued for a progressive internationalism that was at least implicitly compatible with greater 
European transnational co-operation (Featherstone 1988, 1). No, most social democrats’ 
ambivalence about Europe stemmed from their traditional national focus – an emphasis on 
Keynesian economic dirigisme via the institutions of the national state. Ignazio Silone argued that 
‘there is nothing the Socialists nationalize as quickly as socialism’ (quoted in Ladrech 2003, 
114). This may be an exaggeration; but from 1914 until the present, social democrats have often 
prioritised the national to the international, and this ethos has deeply imbued the conduct of the 
PES. Still, approaches to Europe varied widely, with British Labour, the Danish Social 
Democrats and Greek PASOK being the most sceptical (Labour’s notorious 1983 manifesto even 
advocated withdrawal from the EEC), and the Dutch, Belgian, French and German parties being 
most favourable towards common policies. Moreover, there has consistently tended to be a north-
south pro-/anti-EU cleavage, with the northern social democrats (especially the Nordic countries) 
markedly less keen (Almeida 2012, 58). 
 The PES’ formation in 1992 was, typically, less a product of a proactive embrace of 
transnationalism than a pragmatic response to incentives – a case of the EU’s ‘top-down 
institutionalisation’ and political spillover (Lightfoot 2005, 35). The social democrats perceived 
that co-ordination via the EPP allowed Christian democrats far greater policy effectiveness, not 
least through their party leaders’ summits in advance of European Council meetings. This was a 
policy effectiveness they wished to emulate (Ladrech 2000, 95; Ladrech 2003).  
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 At the same time, policy differences over Europe had narrowed significantly and a 
consensus over integration emerged. The failure of the socialist/communist Mitterrand-Mauroy 
government in France in 1981-4 and the ideological onslaught of Thatcherite neo-liberalism 
fundamentally dented social democrats’ confidence that Keynesian policies at national level were 
compatible with a globalised economy. On one hand, this coalescence of views was accelerated 
by the social democrats’ inability to articulate any coherent alternative to the really existing EU – 
somewhat unhappily and grudgingly they began to accept the European Community as a fact 
(e.g. Hanley 2008, 70).  On the other hand, many parties began to hope that economic dirigisme 
at a European level could compensate for the lacunae in their vision. Therefore, many social 
democrats began to embrace a ‘Eurokeynesianism’, which would ‘temper free market policies ex 
ante via regulation rather than ex post via [national-level] regulation’ (Almeida 2012, 54; Aust 
2004). Such EU-level interventionist socioeconomic policies would nevertheless emphatically 
not be accompanied by political federalism (Ladrech 2000, 145). Overall, it proved relatively 
easy to ‘transfer the notion of an interventionist state from the national to the supranational level’ 
(Ladrech 2003, 125). 
 This core consensus allowed the rapid consolidation of the PES as a far more relevant 
actor than the CSPEC. Although there were (and still are) still significant differences over the 
scope of this European ‘party’, there was agreement that, at a minimum, it would help policy 
formulation and reduce transaction costs in order to foster more effective and cohesive policy 
interventions at EU-level. Moreover, reflecting the social democrats’ state-centrism, there was 
agreement that the primary purpose of the PES was to translate and aggregate national party 
priorities, but in no way to limit national party prerogatives. Overall, this was a ‘party of parties’ 
with weak integrative structures rather than an integrated, transnational ‘Europarty’ (Moschonas 
2004, 130).  
 Likewise, Hanley notes that all TNPs are functionally intergovernmentalist organisations, 
since they remain the agents of national principals (Hanley 2008, 66). However, the PES 
arguably takes this intergovernmentalism the furthest. First, it is led by no fewer than three 
intergovernmental organisations: the Council, Presidency, and the Leaders’ Conference; 
moreover, its Statutes explicitly restrict the competences of the TNP; they do not conceive of the 
PES separate from its member parties, but reinforce that its main role is ‘engag [ing] member 
parties’, ‘developing close working relations’ and ‘ensuring close collaboration’ between the 
PES, its affiliates and sympathising groups (PES 2009a article 3). 
 Accordingly, as the PES has institutionalised, it has developed a limited but fairly 
effective ‘think-tank’ function, allowed freedom in policy development and a limited amount of 
ideological co-ordination, so long as it does not infringe the prerogatives of national parties 
(Hanley 2008, 70). This policy-making function is one that constituent parties consider extremely 
useful. Moreover, the PES can be regarded as ‘Europeanising’ the social democrats, by helping 
co-ordinate their activity at European level and by mellowing their opposition towards Europe 
(Ladrech 2000). However, although the PES has facilitated policy convergence and effectiveness 
to a far greater degree than the CSPEC, there are still significant differences of view among 
member parties over its role. Parties like the British Labour Party invest little in the PES and see 
it mainly as a ‘networking arrangement’ (Hanley 2008, 74). At the other end of the spectrum, the 
Belgian and Dutch socialists support a more federal structure, while the French PS and German 
SPD wish to consolidate and develop the organisation, without it becoming a super-party.     
  As befits its size, the PES has traditionally been seen as one of the more policy effective 
TNPs. It played a critical role in getting the Employment Chapter inserted into the 1997 
Amsterdam Treaty and developing the 1999 European Employment Pact, although partly because 
of declining support for social democratic parties, it has had less visible influence since, 
particularly over the Treaty of Nice (2001) and Convention for the Future of Europe (2001-2003), 
which drew up the first EU draft Constitution (Johansson 1999; Ladrech 2000; Lightfoot 2005). 
Nevertheless, its EP parliamentary group has become both stable and cohesive, with a vote 
 4 
cohesion of 91.54% in the 2009-2014 parliament, the third most disciplined group (VoteWatch.eu 
2015a).  
 That said, a more distinct and direct policy impact is difficult to demonstrate. The first EP 
manifesto to which all PES members signed up was achieved only as late as 1999, although far 
from all parties actually used it in their campaigns (Almeida 2012, 49). However, even in the 
2009 EP elections, while parties such as the French PS adopted the PES manifesto in its entirety, 
others like the German SPD barely referenced it and British Labour ignored it altogether (Hertner 
2011). Even at the zenith of recent social democratic influence over Europe in 1997-2002, when 
they held office in thirteen of the then-fifteen EU member states, a unity of purpose was 
conspicuous by its absence. Social democrats were split between traditional Eurokeynesianism 
(as espoused by the French PS) and the new ‘third way’ politics that was much more supportive 
of neo-liberalism, globalisation and EU integration (Therborn 2000). No unified social 
democratic response was noted over key events like the Iraq War: parties such as the PS and SPD 
were in the anti-camp, whereas British Labour was joined by some East-Central European parties 
like the Polish Democratic Left Alliance in uncritical support for the conflict.  
 After 2008, particularly after heavy defeats for British Labour and the SPD, the economic 
crisis environment is regarded as definitively ending the ‘third way’ period in social democracy, 
and the PES has moved back towards a markedly far stronger critique of neo-liberalism in an 
attempt to re-engage with its traditional electorate and values. In the 2009 EP election campaign, 
the PES promoted a manifesto that was more politicised than hitherto and which strongly 
criticised the ‘conservative’ EPP for its inability to address the economic crisis (Gagatek 2009, 
49–50). Nevertheless, this polarising approach was completely vitiated by the PES’ inability to 
agree on an alternative candidate to the EPP’s Jose Manuel Barroso as Commission President 
(Gagatek 2009, 73–74). Moreover, the longer-term social democratic response to the crisis is still 
incoherent. For instance, the Portuguese Socialists and Greek PASOK have participated in 
governments implementing some of the most stringent austerity programmes of all, whereas 
parties such as the BLP and François Hollande’s Socialist Party have latterly campaigned on an 
implicitly anti-austerity ‘pro-growth’ agenda, although radical changes to economic policy have 
been conspicuous by their absence in the conduct of the Hollande government. Given the woeful 
record of austerity measures in promoting post-crisis economic recovery, the consensus around a 
‘pro-growth’ agenda (whatever this means in practice) is likely to increase. However, past 
behaviour certainly indicates that any increasing consensus at PES level will co-exist with 
significantly anomalous policies promoted by PES member parties at national level. Only in the 
unlikely event that member parties wish to institutionalise the PES as a more genuine ‘Europarty’ 
rather than as a limited ‘party-network’ can this dichotomy between rhetoric and practice be 
overcome.  
 
The European Greens – incremental transnationalism? 
 
The European Green Party (also known simply as the ‘European Greens’) was founded only in 
2004. However, it was the first TNP registered under the 2004/2003 EU regulation that laid the 
legal and financial groundwork for European TNPs, and now sees itself as a frontrunner in the 
development of European political parties (Emmott 2012). In 2004, the EGP claimed to be 
running the first European election campaign that featured common motifs and slogans in all EU 
countries (EGP 2008). Since then, the EGP has rapidly moved towards increasing 
institutionalisation and integration, and far more than the PES and EL (although still with 
qualifications) it can be said to aspire towards genuine transnationalism. For instance, Green 
parties accept far greater intervention of the TNP in their policymaking. This includes national 
party manifestos that explicitly mention the EGP and have common policies (for example, the 
‘Green New Deal’ in 2009). Unlike the PES and EL, the Greens describe the role of the TNP in 
explicitly transnational terms: the EGP aims to ‘accomplish a common green political agenda … 
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to ensure close and permanent co-operation among all its Members [to] contribute… to forming 
European awareness and [to] seek to express the political will of the citizens of the European 
Union’ (EGP 2011a Article 3.4).  
 This self-proclaimed frontrunner status is difficult to square with the Greens’ early 
origins. When they first emerged on the European stage, they were a small and disorganised 
force, unable to form a common manifesto or even gain seats in the 1979 EP elections. The Green 
Radical and European Link (GRAEL) group formed in the European parliament in 1984 
contained a number of Green and independent radical parties. It had an often tense relationship 
with the European Green Coordination (EGC), set up the previous year to help strengthen the 
visibility of the Greens internationally (Dietz 2002). Yet, like Green national parties at the time, 
GRAEL was fundamentally split between Realos (pragmatic cadres who saw compromise within 
political institutions as necessary for policy effectiveness) and Fundis (who wanted to stay true to 
their movement origins, sought policy purity and distrusted political institutions). This ‘strategic 
dilemma’ between purity and participation led to significant intra-party and intra-group conflict 
(Bomberg 1998; Hines 2003). By 1989, GRAEL had no ‘agreed collective goals to be pursued in 
Europe’ and ‘had made no firm decision for or against parliamentarisation’ (Bomberg 1998, 109). 
 However, by the late 1990s, the Greens were becoming an increasingly effective and 
integrated force. In 1993 the EGC became the European Federation of Green Parties (EFGP) and 
its links with the European parliamentary Greens were increased. The Greens mustered sufficient 
MEPs to form their own group in 1989. In 1999 their group merged with a number of left-leaning 
regionalist parties to form the Greens/EFA group without any loss of cohesion (perhaps 
unsurprising given their shared distrust of the nation-state). By the 2000s the Greens had become 
among the most disciplined of the EP groups. For example, in the 2009-2014 parliament, the 
Greens/EFA cohesion rate was 94.68 percent (first place) (VoteWatch.eu 2015a).  
  Such a dramatic turnaround in views towards Europe contrasts with the steady trajectory 
of the PES and the very slow integration of the radical left, and demands explanation. After all, 
the radical left has itself also historically suffered from a ‘strategic dilemma’ between policy 
purism and pragmatism, both vis-à-vis Europe and the capitalist system more generally (e.g. 
March 2011). But one factor in the Greens’ greater adaptability towards the EU is ideology. For 
one thing, from the outset the Greens were almost universally in favour of transnationalism in 
parallel to developing national policies – after all, contemporary environmental challenges do not 
respect state borders (Hanley 2008, 171). The Greens express this as ‘thinking globally and 
acting locally’ (EGP 2011a, 8). This certainly contrasts with the ‘socialism in one country’ still 
espoused by the some contemporary communist parties such as the Greek KKE and Portuguese 
PCP, which sees the nation state as the building block of true internationalism (Dunphy 2004). 
Second, the 1980s Greens, while fundamentally divided on their attitudes to the ‘really-existing’ 
EU among federalists, confederalists and those favouring withdrawal, failed to develop a 
consistent ideological opposition to integration. This is because they shared a general consensus 
that state sovereignty needed to be transferred from the nation-state both to regional and 
European levels in order to solve environmental problems – even if they disagreed on whether 
this ‘European level’ was best addressed via the EU institutions or others (such as the Council of 
Europe) (Dietz 2002, 133). Yet for most parties, the EU had relatively low salience, indeed, until 
the early 1990s their concept of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ remained ill-developed and many 
parties focussed on local campaigns, effectively ignoring the EU as an issue (Bomberg 1998, 70). 
Accordingly, Europe has not become politicised as an identity marker among the Greens to the 
degree it has within the radical left. 
 A third factor was domestic incentives – national divisions between Realos and Fundis 
resulted in divided parties that performed poorly at the end of the 1980s. But by the early 1990s, 
the Realos had won the internal conflicts in many parties and increasingly orientated their parties 
towards policy pragmatism, involving more hierarchical and ‘professional’ party organisations 
(Burchell 2001). Domestic incentives were buttressed by the incentives of the EU itself. Hines 
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notes how the EU’s rules of procedure forced the Greens to learn the skills of consensus and 
compromise, which helped strengthen the hand of the Realos within the party organisations 
(Hines 2003). Combined with a wish not to repeat the GRAEL group’s negative experience, and 
a sustained increase in numbers during the 1990s, this enhanced the Greens’ wish to strengthen 
their organisational structures and decision-making in order to be more visible internationally 
(Hanley 2008, 169). In 1999 the Greens produced their first EP manifesto. In sum, relative to the 
radical left, the Greens were newer parties more susceptible to the institutional incentives of the 
EP, with less ideological animus towards European integration and with less hesitancy about 
transnationalism, all of which pushed them towards a more rapid adaptation towards the 
incentives provided by European integration. According to Bomberg, by the 2000s the Greens in 
Europe had become thoroughly Europeanised – their structures were more professionalised and 
their radical policies (including their attitudes to Europe) had ‘mellowed’ and moderated 
significantly (Bomberg 2002).  
 Nevertheless, according to some commentators, the Greens have found it ‘no easier’ than 
any other parties to implement ‘real transnational action’ (Hanley 2008, 171). Certainly, despite 
the mellowing of their ideological radicalism, there are still considerable ideological differences 
between parties. As with other party families, there are significant divergences over views of the 
EU and the related question of how much primacy to award the TNP. The English/Welsh and 
Swedish Greens are more Eurosceptic and EU-critical, whereas the German Greens are 
noticeably more Europeanist and federalist. Generally, Hanley argues that the largest (and not 
coincidentally, more established) parties tend to be more in favour of the TNP than the smaller 
ones (which are more dependent on their links with social movements) (Hanley 2008, 172–175). 
There have been the usual tensions over how much integration to promote and how much 
emphasis to put on organisation via the EU institutions versus how much to work through extra-
parliamentary groups such as the European Social Forum. Moreover, there is has been a constant 
cleavage between the ‘red-green’ or ‘rainbow-green’ parties (such as the German Greens and 
Green Party of England and Wales), who emphasise social questions, egalitarianism and are more 
critical of neo-liberalism and the ‘green-greens’ (such as the French and Irish Greens), who tend 
to be less socially-orientated (Bomberg 1998, 24). Finally, the accession of East-Central 
European Green parties (such as those in the Czech Republic or Estonia) has complicated 
matters, bringing in parties who are both more in favour of the TNP as a source of experience and 
logistical help, and which tend to be more neo-liberal in orientation (similar developments have 
happened with the expansion of the PES to the East).  
 That said, overall, the Greens since 2004 seem to have developed a relatively impressive 
level of policy consensus. Moreover, there appears to be a genuine agreement that the TNP is a 
useful instrument as a service provider, force multiplier and networking organisation whose 
effectiveness needs to be developed (Emmott 2012). Given the Greens’ generally weak numerical 
strength, they can be regarded as punching above their weight in this regard. 
 In addition, the Greens appear to have maximised their influence on the EU policy 
agenda. In this, they have been helped by an increasingly united green movement able to exert 
extra-parliamentary pressure, and the genuine salience of environmental issues among European 
public opinion, which has given them greater leverage than their meagre numbers might imply. 
For example, their pressure during debates over the Maastricht Treaty is seen as instrumental in 
the formation of the EU’s advisory Committee of the Regions (Hines 2003). Moreover, they have 
had success in promoting the idea of a Green Europe, managing to channel public pressure into 
an arguably more radical EU environmental agenda than would otherwise have been possible, all 
of which has ‘enabled them to place certain issues on the European agenda and given them a 
limited ability to change the trajectory of integration’ (Hines 2003, 322). Nevertheless, like the 
EL, because they have few representatives in EU governments, they have had similarly weak 
representation in the EU institutions (no commissioners, scant few members of the Council), 
leading them not to adopt the EPP and PES practice of co-ordinating their policy intentions 
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before EU Council summits. Moreover, also like the EL, EU enlargement has brought little direct 
benefit to the EP group, with very weak representation in the new member states (in 2009 the 
Greens/EFA’s ECE representation was one MEP each from Latvia and Estonia; in 2014, they had 
one MEP from each of Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia). Nevertheless, unlike the 
radical left until its stellar result in 2014, the Greens have generally managed a stable EP group 
representation. In 2009 the Greens/EFA group reached a high point of 55 seats (7.5 per cent of 
the total), a result arguably helped by innovative policies such as the ‘Green New Deal’ and a 
reinforced emphasis on social issues in the wake of the 2008 crisis. In 2014 this fell back 
marginally to 50 seats (6.7 per cent), in part because of Green participation in pro-austerity 
governments (Brustier et al., 2014).  
 
The EL – wider but not deeper 
 
Like the EGP, the EL was created only in 2004 in response to the 2004/2003 EU party regulation. 
Unlike the Greens, although this new political party has brought radical left party co-operation at 
EU level to a historical high, this has hardly been a ‘great leap forward’ into a new level of 
transnationalism. Indeed, the EL has demonstrable weaknesses that mean it is still less than the 
sum of its parts. 
 The most obvious weaknesses are that, whereas the other two TNPs analysed here now 
possess a modest consensus over their EU-level policy, the EL remains partially paralysed by 
long-standing ideological disagreements over the very nature of the EU. Although comparative 
literature tends to regard the radical left as simply ‘Eurosceptic’, this is a dramatic over-
simplification concealing a range of policy positions. For much of the last several decades, a 
dichotomy has emerged between ‘sovereignists’ (including the Portuguese and Greek Communist 
Parties – PCP and KKE) hostile towards all things supranational and supporting their countries’ 
withdrawal from the EU and the ‘Europeanists’ (now represented by the Greek Syriza and 
German Left Party), viewing Euro-rejectionism as regressive protectionism (Dunphy 2004). 
When we add in the legacy of Soviet-era imposed ‘internationalism’, it is understandable why 
this supposedly most internationalist of party families has been remarkably divided at European 
level, and has long eschewed the creation of pan-European transnational links (Chountis 2010). 
Indeed, until 1989, when it split, the Communists and Allies Group in the EP was so starkly 
divided between sovereignists and Europeanists that it never formulated Group policy positions, 
still less a common EP election manifesto. 
This profound ideological-strategic split continued unabated into the 1990s. By 1995, the 
radical left parties in the European parliament gradually coalesced into the current EP group, with 
the deliberately complex title of Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green 
Left (GUE/NGL). Nevertheless, neither the GUE/NGL, nor the New European Left Forum 
(NELF) (launched in 1991 to gather radical left parties twice-yearly to discuss common concerns) 
made any attempt to form a new TNP, or even a common European strategy – indeed, both 
stressed their loose, consensual and networking nature and deliberately eschewed anything 
reminiscent of Comintern-era internationalism (Scholz 2010). 
The formation of the EL in 2004 did amount to an attempt to overcome this schismatic 
past. Europeanist parties increasingly deemed the existing radical left forums inadequate and saw 
supranationalism (with coordinated policy-making and shared strategic thinking) necessary to 
combat dominant neo-liberal globalisation and US hegemony (For more on the origins of EL see 
Dunphy and March [2013]). Nevertheless, it was clear from its foundation that the EL prioritised 
widening over deepening with the aim of inclusivity to heal historical divisions. It defined itself 
as a ‘flexible, decentralised association of independent and sovereign European left-wing parties 
and political organisations which works together on the basis of consensus’ (EL 2010a). More 
explicitly than any other TNP, the EL committed itself to being an inclusive bottom-up ‘network 
party’ with a number of working groups intending to ‘open politics to citizens’, specialising in 
 8 
areas such as trade unions, gender (‘EL-Fem’) and LBGT issues. Similarly, whereas most TNPs 
have a clear hierarchy of membership based on countries’ relationship to the EU (e.g. full 
members, associates and observers), the EL (like the Greens) has no explicit membership criteria 
besides accepting its statutes: full members may be parties in core EU states (German Left), as 
well as those without immediate membership prospects (the Moldovan PCRM).  
 From the outset, the EL contained conflicting impulses towards transnationalism and 
intergovernmentalism. Its internal structure was strongly intergovernmental at founding (Hanley 
2008). It has remained so. For instance, EL structures involve no substantial pooling of party 
sovereignty: whereas all other TNPs (including now the Greens, who originally operated by 
equality of membership rights and consensus principles) use QMV to some degree in Congresses 
and leadership bodies, the EL operates according to strict party equality: each member party 
absolutely irrespective of size has two (gender-balanced) representatives in the Executive Board, 
and sends seven delegates to the Congress. The EL sees this commitment to 
intergovernmentalism as essential in underscoring its decentralised, anti-Stalinist self-image. Yet 
a large proportion of its members are groupuscular micro-parties with little national relevance in 
their constituent countries, such as the Romanian Socialist Alliance Party (PAS) and Czech Party 
of Democratic Socialism. That such micro-parties have equal status to larger parties like the Left 
Party or PCRM in EL bodies is potentially problematic in terms of policy effectiveness, risking 
slowing down policy-making processes and strategic convergence to the pace of the slowest 
and/or smallest members. 
 On the other hand, aspirations to greater transnationalism (and the problems therein) are 
most evident in the EL’s commitment to individual membership -- individuals across Europe can 
join directly without belonging to any national political party. The EL was long the only TNP to 
allow individual membership to activists outside member parties (although ALDE now allows 
‘associate membership’ for individuals and the Greens have ‘supporters’) – these members can 
form friendship circles which may be admitted to EL with observer status. In practice, individual 
membership has been controversial: supporters of developing it, such as the Portuguese Left 
Bloc, see it as one way of developing a new pan-European political consciousness, linking the 
TNP directly to members who consider themselves Europeans without the mediation of a national 
party (Hilário 2010). Critics, such as the French PCF, dislike the category for precisely the same 
reason. Expansion of individual membership rights has been strongly circumscribed by this lack 
of full support from the EL leadership.  
 This debate is similar to that within the EGP (Emmott 2012): the Greens have not (so far) 
decided to institutionalise individual membership as such (since their ‘individual supporters 
network’ [http://isn.europeangreens.eu/] is still party-based, open only to party members or those 
admitted as party supporters, not non-party individuals) (EGP 2009b). However, this is a 
structured network answerable to the EGP council, with a co-ordination team, a regular meeting 
programme and social media presence, and so appears more effective as a way of pooling grass-
roots activists’ activity across Europe. Symptomatically, the PES does not have individual 
members, merely an ‘Activists’ Network’ (http://www.pes.eu/activist)  that since 2010 can put 
proposals to the party leadership. 
 Overall, the EL has consolidated significantly in terms of breadth. By 2013, it 
encompassed 38 parties and organisations – 27 as full members and 11 as observers. It has clearly 
developed a certain momentum and even ‘magnetic attraction’ as the epicentre of the European 
radical left, particularly among the small Eastern European parties (Petrenco 2010). Nevertheless, 
deeper and more effective consolidation in the medium-term is hard to envisage. One of the 
major weaknesses of the EL is that it still encompasses far from all the important parties in the 
party family (which cannot be said of the PES or EGP). Several have joined only as observers, 
such as the Cypriot and Czech Communists (AKEL and KSČM), and several have not joined at 
all. The reasons for non-participation are varied, but combine ideological and practical 
objections. Unsurprisingly, the non-joiners include such ardent euro-rejectionists as the Greek 
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and Portuguese Communist parties, who remain faithful to Soviet-style Marxism-Leninism and 
‘national roads to socialism.’ The former in particular has attacked the EL in virulent terms as a 
’puppet of EU imperialism’ whose main aim is allegedly to benefit from EU funding, split 
European left parties and collaborate with ‘the patently neo-liberal European Union’ (Communist 
Party of Greece 2004). Other significant non-joiners include the Dutch Socialist Party and most 
of the Nordic Green Left – parties which remain suspicious of EL for ideological/strategic 
reasons, being more sovereignist and negative towards transnational co-operation (Hanley 2008).    
 An equally critical weakness of the EL as currently constituted is the division between the 
transnational party and the GUE/NGL EP group. Although in general ‘fear of [TNP] 
encroachment upon the realm of the national party and the European Parliamentary Groups 
remains a considerable obstacle to [TNP] development’ (Shaw and Day 2006, 105), in most 
major TNPs (such as the PES and EGP), the TNP and EP group are now relatively integrated. 
However, since founding in 2004, EL members have never comprised more than 70% of 
GUE/NGL MEPs. As of 2014, the total is only 56% (29 of 52). Moreover, the GUE/NGL has 
included a number of significant parties – principally the Portuguese and Greek communists, 
Dutch Socialist Party, Swedish Left Party and Irish Sinn Féin – that have not joined EL. In no 
way, therefore, can the GUE/NGL be regarded as the European Parliamentary group of EL. 
Although there have been discussions with the EL about forming its own parliamentary sub-
group within GUE/NGL (or giving this group a more cohesive name such as the ‘Left Group’), 
this has been rejected as divisive, leaving the EL to lack any visible presence whatsoever within 
the EP.  
 This has drastically limited any policy-making influence (weak in any case as the 
GUE/NGL even at its post-2014 peak only numbers 52 MEPs, has no commissioners and has  
recently only been represented in the Council via the Cypriot AKEL [2008-13] and Syriza [2015-
]). In theory, the EP group could act as the legislative arm of the TNP, co-ordinating national 
parties in an attempt to implement its manifesto. But with the GUE/NGL group neither 
committed to the EL manifesto nor the EL members therein wishing to harmonise EL voting 
positions, the GUE/NGL remains the least cohesive of any EP group bar the radical right, with no 
demonstrable improvement over time. For example, the group’s Cohesion rate was 79.37 percent 
in 2009-14 as against 85 percent in 2004-9, indicating a marked decline during this period 
(VoteWatch.eu 2015a; VoteWatch.eu 2009a).  
 Commenting on this parlous situation in late 2012, the GUE/NGL chair Gabi Zimmer 
summed up the situation well: ‘a number of parties represented in [the GUE/NGL] hardly show 
any great wish for an increase in the European cooperation and integration of the left …Some 
parties want to view the European Parliament only as a provider of additional resources for their 
national agendas and political struggles. The heterogeneity of beliefs held by the parties 
represented in GUE/NGL with regard to the EU and the struggle against the EU crisis are 
considerable. Behind the different positions and debates there lie deep differences in the 
assessment of social and political power relations on both the national and the EU level as well as 
in the conception of ways to transform them’ (Zimmer 2012).  
What the EL has certainly achieved is producing a common election manifesto for the 
first time in the 2009 EP election campaign. Then EL Chair Lothar Bisky regarded this as a 
‘minor sensation’ (Bisky 2009). It was certainly a big step in historical perspective (after all, it 
took 40 years of radical left co-operation in the EP even to get this far). Nevertheless, given the 
relatively narrow reach and low level of integration that the EL has fostered among the radical 
left, and the aforementioned lack of policy impact, the manifesto’s impact has undoubtedly been 
more symbolic than practical. Overall, this means that the party remains less than the sum of its 
parts – even weaker than the small size of many member parties would indicate – indeed it 
remains among the weakest of all TNPs, largely invisible at EU level outside radical left circles.  
 Overall, this comparison of the development of the left TNPs reveals some limitations 
present in all TNPs: they have integrated only in restricted spheres and in each the national party 
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remains dominant. This process has gone furthest in the PES, where there is limited integration in 
the policy-making realm, but intergovernmentalism prevails elsewhere. By its party structure, 
declared ideology and the cohesion of its parliamentary practice, the EGP is clearly the most 
transnational TNP, although as yet still falling somewhat short of being a genuine pan-European 
party. The EL is somewhat of a mixed bag. It has a proclaimed commitment to transnationalism, 
but the weak implementation of individual membership, its as-yet vitiated policy-making 
function and the untrammelled intergovernmentalism of its internal procedures mean that it is 
certainly the least institutionalised TNP of the three: combined with deep policy disagreements, 
this arguably means that the EL has the worst of all worlds. Whereas both the PES and Greens 
have achieved a certain level of strategic stability, the PES as a limited but cohesive 
intergovernmental structure and the Greens as a more ambitious but less centralised transnational 
party, the EL is both more organisationally inchoate and strategically divided.   
 
Post-crisis policy convergence  
 
The above sections reveal three left TNPs that (despite acknowledged common discussion 
between TNP leaders and structural similarities) have largely followed autonomous development 
paths to reflect the wishes of their constituent member parties. But to what degree can the three 
‘left’ TNPs overcome their autonomous paths to forge a common policy consensus? The fact that 
each TNP has internal disagreements not just about policy but the very scope of action at EU 
level (particularly the EL) does indicate that a broader cross-party policy consensus may be 
heavily circumscribed ab initio. However, this is far from a naïve question – the European 
institutions (including the EP) are widely acknowledged as possessing a largely a-political 
character that depoliticises ideological conflicts and incentivises consensus and compromise in 
decision-making (e.g. Mair 2005). Potentially at least, it allows such intra-party divisions to be 
bridged. Moreover the three party families do generally co-operate to a significant degree in the 
European parliament:  in the 2009-2014 EP the GUE/NGL’s position matched the Greens/EFA 
and S&D on 69.9 percent and 59.7 percent of votes respectively (VoteWatch.eu 2015b). 
However, as explored further below, the Greens/EFA position is itself closer to the S&D (75 
percent of votes matching), while the S&D (in part because of its pivotal position in forming 
parliamentary coalitions) coincides with ALDE most of all, followed by the Greens, EPP and 
only then the GUE/NGL group.  
 Voting records aside, a strong overall coincidence of policy positions between the three 
EP groups is shown in Figure 1. Not unexpectedly, all three groups coalesce towards the top left 
of the table, emphasising expanding the welfare state, environmental protection and liberal social 
values rather than neo-liberal economics and emphases on law and order and restricting 








Note: The seven policy dimensions: ‘Lib Soc’ -­‐ liberal society; ‘Eco Lib’ -­‐ economic 
liberalisation; ‘Financial’ -­‐ restrictive financial policy (low taxation and spending); ‘Law’ -­‐ law and order; 
‘Immigration’-­‐ restrictive immigration policy; ‘Envi’ -­‐ environmental protection; ‘Wel’ -­‐ 
expanded welfare state. The higher the value on a dimension, the stronger the agreement of the Group on 
the policies expressed by the specified dimension. 
Source: adapted from (Bardi et al. 2010) 
 
Dunphy (2004) has analysed the general ideological basis for co-operation between the radical 
left, social democrats and Greens in detail, and argues that the picture is complex, with multiple 
areas for both compromise and contention. With the social democrats, the main common ground 
can be found over state-centric solutions for overcoming economic and social inequalities, 
promoting growth and employment within a broadly Keynesian framework with the role of trade 
unions and the ETUC as core actors in protecting and employment agenda. This framework can 
support European integration, providing it supports ‘social Europe’ that seeks to mitigate the 
market-making and neo-liberal emphases of the EU’s economic directives. Whereas 
contemporary radical left parties usually deny that they are pursuing Keynesian policies as ends 
in themselves, and maintain an aspiration to ‘transform’ capitalism, they will often agree that 
current efforts must focus on defending social democratic gains as a bulwark against neo-
liberalism, including the core institutions of the welfare state (March 2011). In addition, the 
contemporary centre- and radical left tend to share a post-materialist consensus over life-style 
issues, supporting gender, sexual and ethnic equality, environmental concerns and general social 
justice issues. This assertion needs qualification however, because some of the more traditionalist 
communist parties (such as the Greek KKE and Czech KSČM) have traditionally been regarded 
as far less post-materialist in their emphasis. On the other hand, the practice of certain social 
democratic parties in government (particularly their emphasis on national security and more 
restrictive immigration policies), conflicts with (most) radical left parties’ emphasis on open 
borders and free-movement of peoples. 
 The biggest problem in reaching consensus over such issues is internal divisions within 
the party families themselves. In particular, radical left parties have often been able to count on 
the sympathies of considerable numbers of activists within social democratic parties who have 
helped them with a strategy of acting as the ‘conscience of the left’ and pressuring social 
democratic parties in a left-wards direction against neo-liberalism. However, particularly under 
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the influence of ‘third way’ ideas, social democratic party leaderships were prone to promote 
neo-liberal policies of privatisation, market deregulation and welfare-state retrenchment (reaching 
their apogee in the Agenda 2010 cuts to welfare in Germany in 2003-5 that were initiated by the 
SPD/Green government).  Even nominally ‘Eurokeynesian’ parties such as the French PS have 
demonstrated a very chequered record in government – for example the PS-led Jospin 
government of 1997-2002 undertook more privatisations than the previous six governments 
combined (Dunphy 2004, 102), a significant factor in Jospin’s disastrous electoral performance in 
2002, and in the electoral collapse of the PCF which had participated fully in that government 
right until the end of its term in office. There are still a large number of radical left parties, and 
significant numbers of activists within them, ready to use such records to argue that social 
democrats are untrustworthy partners and irredeemable defenders of the bourgeois state – and 
that the mistakes of previous experiences of governmental participation must not be repeated.  
 Foreign policy differences (including different attitudes to European integration) also 
continue to divide the centre- and radical left. Broadly speaking, the centre-left remains 
Atlanticist, while the radical left remains deeply opposed to the Euro-Atlantic political and 
economic institutions (NATO, the IMF and World Bank), and is prone to a certain Russophilia 
(although this is contentious within the party family itself). Certainly, common attitudes are 
found between radical left parties and social democratic activists over individual issues such as 
Israel’s occupation of Palestine and opposition to the Iraq war. The SPD also won votes from the 
German Left Party in 2002 on the basis of opposition to American military interventionism. 
However, generally, a gulf remains between the party families on the international military and 
economic issues -- the radical left position generally supports the dissolution of NATO, 
opposition to military intervention and the abolition of nuclear weapons, while simultaneously 
promoting the fundamental reform or even abolition of the IMF and the World Bank for similar 
reasons, since all these institutions are seen as instruments of neo-liberal American hegemony 
and thereby interweave globalisation and militarism. The social democratic position, at least at 
the official level, is largely uncritical of these existing institutional structures. Similarly, social 
democrats’ own occasional misgivings about EU integration have rarely translated into demands 
for fundamental changes to the EU as such. Indeed, it is the radical left’s claim that the social 
democrats uncritically support EU integration and neo-liberal globalisation that have reinforced 
its ability to use opposition to the ‘really existing EU’ as a fundamental identity marker 
(Moschonas 2009). 
 In contrast, there is arguably much more common ideological ground between the Greens 
and the radical left. Many Greens criticise capitalism for its wasteful, growth-centric policies 
(although they often criticise socialism for the same reasons) and seek alternative economic 
models which can maximise democracy, local decision-making and social justice, all aims which 
the radical left can share. Although most Green parties’ opposition to capitalism can no longer be 
regarded as radical (March and Mudde 2005), this is less true of their activists, many of whom 
cooperate with the social forums and global justice movement alongside the activists of left-wing 
parties (Doherty 2002). A large number of radical left parties (including several in the EL such as 
the Portuguese Left Bloc, Danish Red-Green Alliance and Finnish Left Alliance) are explicitly 
left-libertarian parties who have sought to address environmental, feminist and minority rights 
concerns alongside more traditional labour-focussed issues. 
 Nevertheless, as Dunphy (2004) points out, there is much that still divides the Greens and 
radical left. Above all is the attitude to the nation-state. Whereas both party families espouse 
localism and local democracy, express hesitation about engaging with the compromises of 
‘mainstream’ politics, and have an emphasis on extra-parliamentary work, in practice, many 
Greens regard the radical left’s viewpoint as much more state-centric, centralist and even 
hierarchical. This is certainly true of traditional communist parties, though far less accurate as a 
description of left-libertarian parties already mentioned and even reform communist parties like 
the Italian Rifondazione Comunista. Nevertheless, engrained Green suspicions of the communists 
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persist. For instance, Margrete Auken, MEP for the Danish Socialist People’s Party, once a 
radical left but now increasingly a mainstream Green party, regards the traditional communist 
forms of organisation as constricting on individual activity – top-down organisation ‘kills 
everything’ as she puts it (Auken 2012). In addition, differences in attitude over the balance 
between materialist and post-materialist issues still divide the radical left and Greens.  For 
instance, while the radical left can find common ground with the ‘red-greens’ over the priority of 
egalitarianism, green-greens are much more prone to prioritise libertarian over social issues and 
even to join right-wing neo-liberal coalitions (for example in Ireland in 2007-2011 and the Czech 
Republic in 2007-9). On the other hand, a number of radical left parties (such as the PCF and 
KSČM) continue to defend nuclear power as necessary for national development, a position 
obviously unacceptable to Green parties. 
 There are similar convergences and divergences in international policy. Notwithstanding 
their acceptance of European integration, many Greens remain suspicious of the EU for its neo-
liberal, statist and growth-oriented policies, and (far more than the social democrats) advocate 
structural reform of the EU to address its perceived democratic deficit – all policies which find 
some resonance among radical left parties. Nevertheless, like the social democrats, the Greens are 
largely supportive of the existing Euro-Atlantic institutions:  while they accept the need for some 
institutional reform, and are largely anti-militarist – for example, Greens strongly criticise NATO 
for its lack of emphasis on nuclear disarmament (EGP 2010) -- there is no support for the 
dissolution of NATO or for radical changes to the Euro-Atlantic neo-liberal financial structures. 
 Moreover, as Holmes and Lightfoot argue (Holmes and Lightfoot 2007, 152) ‘the devil is 
in the detail’: although there is much overlap in ideological proclivities, how party family 
ideologies are borne out in specific policies points to often very divergent emphases. 
Nevertheless, and particularly after the 2008 crisis, there are several policies that can form the 
basis for agreement. For example, Table 2 compares the post-2008 manifestos and major policy 
documents of the PES, EGP and EL, marking some of the main policy proposals. Where there is 
approximate agreement between two parties these are marked in Italics, and where all three 
parties have a modicum of agreement, these are marked in Bold.  
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Table 2: Policy priorities of the left TNPs, 2008-2015 
 
Party PES EGP EL 
Policy area    





regulation of financial 
markets/banking system, 
Banking Union  
 
 
Limits on financial pay and 
bonuses  
Measures against tax 
avoidance/tax havens 
(Youth) employment 
emphasis and investment in 
‘smart green growth’  
Skills and training focus via 
EU budget 
Investment in co-ops  





European Central Bank to 





Financial transaction tax 
Eurobonds for sustainable 
debt refinancing  











Flexible budgets and debt-
reduction (2014) 




Reform of financial 
markets; EU watchdog 
needed; European Banking 
Union 
Breaking up banking groups, 
properly size financial sector 
Limits on financial pay and 
bonuses  
Measures against tax 
avoidance/tax havens 
Focus on employment and 
‘New Green Deal’ 
 
Localisation of economy 
 
 
Non-growth model: GDP and 
GDP per capita should no 
longer play predominant role; 
social progress clause in 
European law 
ECB to focus on social and 
ecological development and 




Financial transaction tax 
Eurobonds for sustainable 
debt refinancing  
 
 
Increase progressive income 
tax and harmonise European 
taxation 
Increase environmental taxes 
 
Reform Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) to focus on 
sustainable growth 
 




Increase EU budget 




Changing existing rules of 
the international economic 
and financial system 
 
Public and social control 
over banking system 
 
 
Abolish tax havens 
 
Employment, social and 





Nationalisation of strategic 




ECB to focus on social and 
ecological development and 
issuing credit 
European public bank of 
social and solidarity-based 
development funded by ECB 
Financial transaction tax 
Eurobonds for sustainable 
debt refinancing  
Creation of European public 
rating agency 
Raise income taxes and 
harmonise European taxation 
 
Raise workers’ wages and 
incomes 
SGP replaced by new pact of 
growth, full employment, 
social and environmental 
protection  
Debt-alleviation of EU 
indebted countries 
Debt Abolition  
European Debt Conference  
 
Social ‘New Social Europe’: 
improved standards in 
Green New Deal: 
investment in education, 
Investment in education, 
health and social care, 
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social, health and education 
policies 
Strengthen welfare systems 
via fair tax policies 
EU minimum wage 
Universal access to public 
services 
Fair work-life balance 
 
Strengthening rights of 






Support gender equality - 




Measures to regulate legal 







organised and cross-border 
crime 




EU minimum wage 











Support gender equality 
 
 
Develop EU charter of 
fundamental rights 
Fair migration – oppose 
Fortress Europe.  Frontex 
border control system to 
acknowledge International 
Refugee Conventions and the 







EU minimum wage/pension 
Oppose privatisation of 
public services 









Support gender equality 
 
 
Develop EU charter of 
fundamental rights 
Oppose Fortress Europe. 
Oppose Frontex. Migrants to 





Oppose EU anti-terrorism 
policy  
Enviromental Sustainable development; 
EU to achieve global 30% 
cut in emissions by 2020 
 
Investment in ‘smart green 
growth’, environmental 
transport 
Support for developing 
countries to fight climate 
change 
Form global energy and 
development forum 
European Common Energy 
Policy 
Reform of CAP 
 
Monitoring of nuclear power 
Sustainable development; 
EU to achieve global 
emissions cut of 30% by 
2020, 55% by 2030 
Green New Deal – new 
green technologies, 
sustainable transport 
Support for adaptation of 
developing countries 
 






End investment in nuclear 
power 
Oppose GM foods 
Reform Common Fisheries 
Policy 




EU to achieve global 
emissions cut of 30-40% by 
2020 
Increase use of renewable 
energy 
 











Oppose GM foods 
Rural development policy 
 
Institutional  Strengthen transparency of ‘Democratic refoundation’ Popular control of EU 
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EU institutions; regulate 
lobbying; democratic 
control of EU via national 
parliaments 
Greater role for EP – 
legislative, budgetary and 
control powers 
Regions and local authorities 
to have greater role in EU 
politics 







of Europe; Strengthen 
transparency of EU 
institutions; regulate 
lobbying 
EP to have right of 
legislative initiative 
 
EU as effective multi-level 
democracy 
 
More politically integrated 
Europe via EU-wide 
referendum 
Referenda on landmark EU 
decisions 
Proportion of MEPs to be 











No to Lisbon Treaty 
 
 
Referenda on landmark EU  
decisions 
Generalise proportional 
electoral system in EP 
elections  
International Support Millennium 
development goals 
Support fair trade and 
poverty reduction  
 
 
Raise overseas development 
aid 




Reform of decision-making 





Strengthening EU Common 
Foreign and Security Policy 
 
 








EU enlargement to Western 




Fair trade first 
 
Oppose TTIP in its current 
form 
Raise overseas development 
aid 
WTO to transform free trade 
to fair trade agenda 
 
 
Reforming UN to achieve 
multilateral global 
governance  
EU to support UN in conflict 
resolution – create European 
Civil Peace Corps  
Environmentally and human-










Nuclear disarmament  
Support EU enlargement, 
focussed on Mediterranean 
and Eastern Europe  
Support Millennium 
development goals 
Support fair trade and 
poverty reduction 
Oppose TTIP; no US-EU free 
market 
Debt redemption for poorest 
countries 
WTO to exclude agriculture 
and end neo-liberal agenda 
Revise WB/IMF structural 
adjustment programmes 
Conflict resolution based on 
OSCE and reformed UN 
 
EU to respect international 
law and strive for political 
solutions to all conflicts 
End to EU military 
engagement abroad; review 
military co-operation with 
USA  
Dissolve NATO –replace 
with new International Co-
operative Security system 
Replace EU Defence agency 
with disarmament agency 
Oppose European missile 
defence 
International disarmament 
Support EU enlargement, 
particularly to Turkey 
 
Sources: (PES 2009b; PES 2010, PES 2014; EGP 2009a; EGP 2012c; EGP 2014; EL 2009; EL 2010b, EL 2014) 
  
Table 2 reinforces that, whatever the specific nuances, there is general agreement on the broad 
parameters of policy between the three party families: each seeks a socially just, environmentally 
sustainable economy that invests in public services, with regulation and reform of the financial 
 17 
markets a must, a focus on poverty reduction at home and abroad, protection for minorities and 
the disadvantaged and foreign policies that focus on environmental regulation, support for 
developing countries and conflict resolution. There is a basic level of agreement on the need to 
reform EU institutions in the interests of greater transparency and popular input (although wide 
variance on the proposed mechanisms), and even a consensus that international economic 
organisations need reform (although significant differences on which institutions, and the nature 
of that reform). 
 In general, there is least consensus in world affairs and most in the intra-EU economic 
realm. For example, despite commitments to fair trade, poverty reduction and international 
disarmament, neither the PES nor the Greens propose fundamental reforms to the existing global 
architecture (and indeed the PES wants augmentation of European defence and anti-terror 
capabilities). The EL is the only TNP explicitly to oppose the neo-liberalism of the WTO, WB 
and IMF (although without advocating clear alternatives) and is the only consistently anti-
militarist TNP, completely rejecting NATO, US-led European Missile Defense and EU 
militarisation.  
 However, a perhaps surprising amount of common ground on economic policy is shown, 
not just on general aspirations such as overcoming tax havens and tax avoidance, but on more 
specific proposals such as reform of the European Central Bank, a financial transaction tax and 
Eurobonds. Furthermore, the EL agrees with the PES on the need to replace the private credit 
ratings agencies with a more public ratings agency in order to overcome the over-weaning power 
of American private groups on EU economic policy. The EL and Greens can agree on replacing 
the European Stability and Growth pact (with its emphasis on neo-liberal economics) with one 
focussed on socially and environmentally sustainable growth.  
 It goes without saying that, unlike the other TNPs, the EL’s anti-neo-liberalism is often a 
proxy for anti-capitalism (though this is not always explicit). This is shown in far greater hostility 
to the existing economic architecture, a preference for greater structural reform, as well as more 
direct economic dirigisme (e.g. via re-nationalisation and raising public sector wages). 
Nevertheless, there is a general level of consensus on moderating market excesses via greater 
state intervention.  
 It is quite clear that this consensus has been accelerated as a result of the economic crisis. 
In the 2004 EP election, only the EL had much critical to say about neo-liberalism (see Table 3). 
By 2009, all three TNPs devoted a considerable part of their EP manifestos to castigating the 
current economic model for producing the crisis, although only the EL and Greens directly 
attacked neo-liberalism – the PES did so only more implicitly (see Table 3). Moreover, the PES’ 
adoption of a financial transaction tax is significant, since the party has only belatedly and 
hesitantly embraced it (it was not present in their 2004 manifesto). This brings the PES position 
much closer to that of the radical left and Greens, who have been advocating such measures since 
the early 2000s, although in general (and this was particularly marked in 2014), the PES’ 
positions are much more generalist and less policy-specific, more focussed on criticism of 
austerity than neo-liberalism per se, than the other left TNPs’. According to some, the PES’ 
increasing internal homogeneity, particularly its East-West divisions, have prevented it having a 
coherent, co-ordinated or even adequate ideological response to the crisis, and the 2014 
programme is even a step backwards in this regard (Brustier et al. 2014).   
 
Table 3: Changing views of neo-liberalism from TNP manifestos  
 
 2004 EP Election  2009 EP Election  2014 EP Election 
PES • Our vision of the 
European Union is a 
community based on the 
principles of the social 
market economy and 
mutual cooperation for 
the benefit of all 
• European elections are…the 
choice between our vision of a 
progressive Europe…Or a 
conservative, regressive Europe in 
which the future of our countries 
and people is left in the hands of 
the market and of forces beyond 
democratic control 
• We must promote better 
cooperation in Europe to manage 
globalization for the benefit of 
everyone. They say adapt to the 
market. We say shape our future 
• The global financial crisis has 
exposed the weaknesses of the 
unregulated Market 
• This crisis marks the end of a 
conservative era of badly-
regulated markets. Conservatives 
believe in a market society and 
letting the rich get richer, to the 
detriment of everyone else. We 
believe in a social market 
economy that enables everyone in 
society to make the most of the 
opportunities globalization offers 
• The right wing has created a 
Europe of fear and 
austerity…we have fought for a 
strong, socially just and 
democratic Europe 
• Austerity-only policy has 
harmed our economies and 
punished those least responsible 
for causing the crisis 
• After the end of the Troika 
missions, another model within 
the framework of the EU 
Treaties should be established, 
which has to be democratic, 
socially responsible and credible 
• The right wing has used 
neoliberal policies to cut 
provisions that have helped 
people bounce back after tough 
times. We will fight for a Europe 
that leaves no one behind 
EGP • We want a social Union 
built on the basic 
principles of equality and 
solidarity 
• We resist the neo-liberal 
tendency to leave 
everything to the market 
• For us Greens, the EU 
must play an important 
role in reforming and 
regulating the presently 
unfair system of 
globalization 
 
• The financial crisis and credit 
crunch have brought the failings of 
current economic and social 
policies sharply into focus. They 
have exposed a wider systemic 
failure 
• The dominant neoliberal ideology 
in Europe has established a system 
where the interests of the few 
come before the general well-
being of its citizens 
• The neoliberal majority in the 
European Parliament, the Council 
and the European Commission is 
guilty of bowing to the demands of 
industry lobbies, putting short-
term profits before the general 
interest  
• Neo-liberal deregulation has 
created financial markets solely 
driven by short–term greed, 
resulting in the global financial 
crisis that is still with us today  
• The medicine of austerity that 
has been prescribed to countries 
in crisis for several years now 
has increased social division and 
injustice, jeopardised the well-
being of many of our fellow 
citizens, undermined the capacity 
of our societies to prosper, and 
crucially, weakened democracy  
• We need cooperation within the 
EU to deal effectively with these 
issues. The transformation we 
advocate must go hand in hand 
with a democratic re-foundation  
• Instead of socially deaf and 
environmentally blind austerity, 
we propose three coherent 
avenues to sustainability: fighting 
unemployment, poverty and all 
forms of social injustice; 
transforming our economies with 
innovation and eco-efficient 
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solutions to tackle climate 
change and environmental 
degradation; re-regulating the 
financial industry so it serves the 
real economy. We call this a 
European Green New Deal 
EL • A new vision is inspiring 
growing numbers of 
Europeans and uniting 
them to join in great 
mobilisations to resist 
the imposition of a 
capitalist one-way street 
that is an attempt to trap 
humanity in a new social 
and cultural regression  
• In Europe…the people 
are suffering from the 
policies of globalised 
capitalism implemented 
by governments in the 
interest of big capital and 
lobbies 
• We want to build a 
project for another 
Europe and to give 
another content to the 
EU… alternative to 
capitalism in its social 
and political model 
• We want a Europe free 
from the antidemocratic 
and neoliberal policies of 
WTO and IMF 
• As political forces of 
social transformation, we 
want to contribute to this 
new dynamic that is 
resolutely attacking neo-
liberal policies 
• We are facing financial, economic 
and social crises, a crisis of the 
whole system… 
• The crisis is caused by the 
globalisation of hazardous neo-
liberal capitalism, which is…being 
pushed ahead by irresponsible 
elites in charge of politics and 
economics 
• The crisis is once more 
demonstrating the failure of neo-
liberal globalisation, which has, on 
a global scale, maximised the 
profits of the financial market’s 
main players without any state 
control and intervention. Politics, 
states and entire societies are 
subordinated to uncontrolled 
financial markets 
• As a result, the neo-liberal 
foundations of the EU treaties are 
called into question, particularly in  
reference to the idea of an "open 
market economy with free 
competition": the unchecked free 
circulation of capital, the 
liberalisation and privatisation of 
public services, and the status and 
mission of the European Central 
Bank 
 
• The starting point of our proposal 
is our opposition to the crux of 
the debt crisis in Europe: 
neoliberal policy that has 
minimised the contribution of 
capital to financial needs, 
imposed austerity programmes, 
lead to the termination of 
democracy and working rights 
and to an unprecedented 
humanitarian crisis in a series of 
EU member- states 
• The financial crisis was the 
pretext for going further into 
ultraliberalism, for imposing 
barbaric austerity plans, and 
social and democratic regressions 
• In country after country, we see 
the "Troika" landing...With the 
complicity of our governments, 
they lower our wages and 
pensions, slash public services, 
privatise and plunder. The result 
is rocketing unemployment and 
precariousness; life is becoming 
harder 
• Stop austerity to prevent human 
and humanitarian catastrophe 
• We do not accept the neoliberal 
criteria of Economic and 
Monetary Union and demand that 
employment, social development 
and democracy be given priority 
Source: (PES 2004; PES 2009b, PES 2014; EGP 2003; EGP 2009a; EGP 2014; EL 2004; EL 
2009; EL 2014) 
 
 This policy convergence among the TNPs has been furthered by some (albeit limited) 
attempts among the broader left to find a common left response to the crisis. Whereas the 
political foundations of each TNP largely work in isolation from each other, the European 
parliament has helped bridge differences through conferences and workshops discussing policy 
options. One major such instance was the forum ‘Another Road for Europe’ in the EP on 28 June 
2012 that gathered MEPS from the S&D, Greens/EFA and GUE/NGL groups alongside social 
movements and civil society organisations to discuss exits from the crisis.3  Also indicative was 
the Left Caucus, a cross-party group representing MEPs from the three left EP groups set up by 
eight MEPs in 2011. The Caucus aimed to respond to the defeat of the left in the June 2009 
elections by provoking ‘an ongoing debate and exchange of views among … progressives … in 
… a much more comprehensive, open-minded, transparent and persuasive way’, aiming to 
‘organise debates and hearings, adopt common statements and engage in shared legislative and 
political work’ (Left Caucus 2011). Nevertheless, despite indicating an increased wish to have 
common policies that bridge the confines of the normal political families, the Left Caucus  
petered out after initially publicising proposals for overcoming the economic crisis. 
Might such attempts to bridge ideological and policy cleavages result in more united and 
effective left intervention at European level? Certainly, an opportunity was presented by the 
Cypriot Presidency of the Council of the European Union from June-December 2012, which 
made AKEL’s Demetris Christofias the first communist to head the EU’s agenda-setting body. 
For sure, the six-month presidential period is too short to make a substantive impact (and in any 
case the presidency is traditionally an impartial body that is supposed to stand for the EU’s 
general interest). Be that as it may, at Christofias’ inaugural speech, he lambasted austerity 
policies and the unaccountability of the markets, while defending ‘A Europe of social cohesion, 
prosperity, security and growth’ (Christofias 2012). Significant also was that in January and May 
2012, the PES invited Christofias to its pre-Council leaders’ meetings in order to discuss common 
approaches during the Cypriot presidency (e.g. Cyprus News Agency 2012). The EGP also 
offered a generally positive assessment of the prospects of the Cypriot presidency (Sakadaki 
2012). Despite the institutional and temporal limitations, the presidency offered at the very least 
the prospect of greater trust-building and contact between the different families of the left. 
Nevertheless, with AKEL losing the Cypriot presidential election in February 2013, the chance of 
significantly building on this period was lost. 
Altogether, growing commonalities between the left TNP manifestos and incipient co-
operation initiatives must be weighed up against significant, lasting barriers to more integrated 
positions. Most obvious is that, despite the GUE/NGL achieving a historical high of 52 seats in 
2014, the left parties still make up a minority of the European parliament and have only achieved 
a marginal increase overall (39 percent of seats since 2014 as opposed to 37 percent in the 2009-
2014 parliament). They still have a minority of European national governments. Only a 
significantly greater representation in the EP, combined with a greater share of positions in the 
European Council, might really give the potential for fuller left-wing legislative and executive 
authority at the EU level. Much obviously depends on whether the Syriza government in Greece 
can achieve any real or symbolic moderation of austerity policies that might provide a 
demonstration effect and credibility breakthrough for distinct left-wing policy prescriptions 
elsewhere, which at the time of writing looks exceedingly dubious. Moreover, the failure of the 
last period of centre-left dominance of Europe in 1997-2002 certainly allows some reasonable 
doubt to be cast on any such potential even should the left gain optimal results in years to come. 
 Of equal importance is that de facto MEP co-operation between the party families still 
leaves much to be desired. Not least is the perennial problem that the TNP manifesto cannot 
simply be read as a blueprint for MEPs’ legislative actions, especially in the case of the radical 
left. If we don’t have clear policy coherence within each party family, it is difficult to envisage it 
across the broader left! 
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 Additionally, the aforementioned legislative coalitions between the EP groups look still 
less impressive on more detailed analysis (see Table 4). Certainly, the 2009-2014 parliament 
indicated a close co-operation between the GUE/NGL, Greens/EFA and S&D on gender issues 
(c. 90% vote correspondence) environmental, development, legal affairs and civil liberties issues 
(over 80% correspondence), but on economic and monetary affairs and employment and social 
affairs there was a congruence of only circa 50%! This is markedly less co-operation in these 
areas than in the 2004-2009 parliament (when GUE/NGL co-operation with the PES was c 55% 
and with the Greens/EFA c. 70%.  These statistics needs explanation, since they clearly 
conflict with the increasing economic congruence noted in the TNP manifestos. On closer 
analysis it is clear that the GUE/NGL is the outlier – the Greens/EFA and S&D coincide with 
each other over 70% of the time in these and other policy realms. Furthermore, their positions in 
all policy areas align with each other more than in the previous parliament (75% versus 70%), 
but with the GUE/NGL less than in the previous parliament (S&D coalitions with the GUE/NGL 
have fallen from 62% to 60% and Green/EFA coalitions with GUE/NGL from 74% to 70%). 
 What explains this? It is plausible that whereas the consensus on anti-neo-liberalism has 
helped draw the Greens/EFA and S&D closer together, particularly on economic issues, it has 
coincided with a toughening of positions within the GUE/NGL. This was alluded to in Zimmer’s 
aforementioned remark that several GUE/NGL constituent parties apparently do not want greater 
co-operation. Moreover, within the GUE/NGL, some have noted that the absence of 7 Italian 
MEPs from the 2009-2014 parliament (because of the collapse of the Italian radical left in 2008) 
deprived the group of some of its more pragmatic and Europhile members and given greater 
emphasis to a more intransigent newer influx (e.g. de Jong 2011). 
 On even closer inspection, the GUE/NGL’s harder line is apparent. When the GUE/NGL 
disagreed with economic and employment initiatives supported by both the S&D and 
Greens/EFA, the primary reason for dissensus was both the GUE/NGL’s reticence about 
supporting any initiatives that might smack of neo-liberalism, and its preference for profound 
structural reform. For instance, on 13 June 2012, the GUE/NGL opposed a law on ‘Economic and 
budgetary surveillance of Member States with serious difficulties with respect to their financial 
stability in the Euro area’ on the basis that it did not change the prevailing preference for 
‘undemocratic’ austerity measures. In contrast, the Greens/EFA and S&D supported it because it 
entailed support for growth measures, employment and Eurobonds.4  
In February 2011, the GUE/NGL opposed the EP resolution on the ‘ECB Annual report 
for 2010’.5 The group argued that the ECB was not independent, and was being ‘politically 
manipulated’ by bankers in such a way as to embed austerity policies within the EU body politic. 
The ECB needed reform of its statutes and parliamentary control of its activities, in order to focus 
on full employment, the economy and sustainable growth and not simply budgetary stability. In 
contrast, despite manifesto demands for reform of the ECB, the Greens and S&D were satisfied 
with the resolution’s demands for greater ECB transparency and support for policies like 
Eurobonds. Similarly, among other votes, the GUE/NGL group opposed legislation on 
employment policy and promoting workers’ mobility on the grounds that they fetishised labour 
market flexibility over social protection, and promised positive measures that were mere 
palliatives (the Greens and S&D in contrast argued that labour market flexibility was one of the 




Table 4. Matching positions between left EP groups on key issues  
 
Issue Group 2004-2009 Group 2009-2014 
 
  PES Greens/EFA GUE/NGL   S&D Greens/EFA GUE/NGL  
All areas PES  X 69.83 62.01 S&D X 74.96 59.72 
 Greens/EFA 69.83 X 74.04 Greens/EFA 74.96 X 69.93 
 GUE/NGL 62.01 74.04 X GUE/NGL 59.72 69.93 X 
Agriculture  PES X 63.20 49.26 S&D X 69.48 57.52 
 Greens/EFA 63.20 X 53.12 Greens/EFA 69.48 X 68.81 
 GUE/NGL 49.12 53.12 X GUE/NGL 57.52 68.81 X 
Budget PES X 74.94 62.65 S&D X 74.67 66.37 
 Greens/EFA 74.94 X 68.92 Greens/EFA 74.67 X 71.26 
 GUE/NGL 62.65 68.92 X GUE/NGL 66.37 71.26 X 
Civil liberties, 
justice and home 
affairs 
PES X 82.32 73.08 S&D X 84.86 71.10 
 Greens/EFA 82.32 X 80.35 Greens/EFA 84.86 X 80.05 





PES X 61.65 42.48 S&D X 76.72 38.93 
 Greens/EFA 61.65 X 61.17 Greens/EFA 76.72 X 53.82 
 GUE/NGL 42.48 61.17 X GUE/NGL 38.93 53.82 X 
Culture and 
education 
PES X 80.60 64.18 S&D X 90.00 61.25 
 Greens/EFA 80.60 X 72.39 Greens/EFA 90.00 X 66.25 
 GUE/NGL 64.18 72.39 X GUE/NGL 61.25 66.25 X 
Development PES X 92.13 89.89 S&D X 92.52 83.18 
 Greens/EFA 92.13 X 91.01 Greens/EFA 92.52 X 88.79 
 GUE/NGL 89.89 91.01 X GUE/NGL 83.18 88.79 X 
Economic and 
monetary affairs 
PES X 74.27 55.58 S&D X 85.49 51.68 
 Greens/EFA 74.27 X 68.69 Greens/EFA 85.49 X 53.63 
 GUE/NGL 55.58 68.69 X GUE/NGL 51.68 53.63 X 
Employment and 
social affairs 
PES X 73.88 57.96 S&D X 77.52 51.38 
 Greens/EFA 73.88 X 73.88 Greens/EFA 77.52 X 56.65 
 GUE/NGL 57.96 73.88 X GUE/NGL 51.38 56.65 X 
Environment and 
public health 
PES X 73.55 74.81 S&D X 85.66 83.06 
 Greens/EFA 73.55 X 87.53 Greens/EFA 85.66 X 89.89 
 GUE/NGL 74.81 87.53 X GUE/NGL 83.06 89.89 X 
Foreign & 
security policy 
PES X 68.88 58.85 S&D X 67.90 41.25 
 Greens/EFA 68.88 X 65.10 Greens/EFA 67.90 X 59.15 
 GUE/NGL 58.85 65.10 X GUE/NGL 41.25 59.15 X 
Gender equality  PES X 85.83 86.61 S&D X 91.89 91.51 
 Greens/EFA 85.83 X 88.19 Greens/EFA 91.89 X 89.19 




PES X 61.54 66.15 S&D X 80.14 69.50 
 Greens/EFA 61.54 X 85.38 Greens/EFA 80.14 X 63.12 
 GUE/NGL 66.15 85.38 X GUE/NGL 69.50 63.12 X 
International PES X 57.14 55.56 S&D X 60.45 53.15 
 3 
trade 
 Greens/EFA 57.14 X 85.71 Greens/EFA 60.45 X 81.36 
 GUE/NGL 55.56 85.71 X GUE/NGL 53.15 81.36 X 
Legal affairs PES X 78.40 75.93 S&D X 74.07 58.80 
 Greens/EFA 78.40 X 91.36 Greens/EFA 74.07 X 71.76 
 GUE/NGL 75.93 91.36 X GUE/NGL 58.80 71.76 X 
Source: (VoteWatch.eu 2009b; VoteWatch.eu 2015b) 
 
  
 These examples indicate that despite ostensible programmatic similarities, deeper 
ideological cleavages between the left TNPs over socio-economic issues remained highly 
relevant. Although the crisis has produced greater verbal consensus over the need to combat neo-
liberalism, and even a core of policies to do this, the voting records indicate that anti-neo-
liberalism is still understood very differently. While greater consensus is possible over issues that 
do not relate directly to this cleavage (for example human and minority rights issues), ostensible 
common ground over economic policies is vitiated by the radical left’s continued commitment to 
transformative change of capitalism. Unlike the Greens and social democrats, the radical left (at 
least within the EP) regards amendment of neo-liberalism short of major structural changes as 
half-measures which largely duck the critical issues.  
 Finally, the biggest obstacle to further pan-European left unity is undoubtedly the 
structure of the ‘European’ electorate, which is still, composed of national parties rooted in 
national electorates. The national electoral dynamic is a competitive one that the more co-
operative, consensual impetus of the European parliament, the commitment to common TNP 
manifestos and networking between TNPs cannot counterbalance. Nationally, the three party 
families are certainly increasingly prone to co-operate (for example, Greens, social democrats and 
the radical left have joined coalitions in France, Italy and Finland since the 1990s, the RGA has 
supported the social-democratic-green-social liberal coalition in Denmark from 2011-14, and the 
Swedish V joined a ‘Red-Green’ coalition (modelled on the governing coalition in Norway) in 
2008-2010 that unsuccessfully contested the 2010 election). Nevertheless, pan-left co-operation 
is often less than the sum of its parts, since each party family’s electorate overlaps to a 
considerable degree and they are fishing in the same pool for new voters. Radical left parties can 
certainly increase their support bases from non-voters and social liberals, and not infrequently the 
radical right (March 2011). However, dramatic increases in the support of one left party often 
coincide with a fall in the vote for another (such as the SP in Netherlands gaining from the 
Labour Party in 2006 and the LP and Greens in Germany winning at the expense of the SPD in 




The European level of the left’s party activity shows clearly some of the weaknesses that have 
beset its response to crisis. First, most, obviously, their representation at European level, even 
combined, falls way short of a legislative majority in the EP. Second, reflecting their roots in 
national parties, the left TNPs are largely content to plough their own furrows in terms of 
organisation and programmes. Despite increasingly common policy understandings, which have 
only increased since the 2008 international economic crisis (particularly a consensus over the 
need to find more equitable, socially just and environmentally sustainable alternatives to neo-
liberalism) there is little obvious direct policy learning between parties. There are some 
exceptions: the Greens at least admit to close observance of how other TNPs respond to party 
legislation (Emmott 2012). Moreover, initiatives like the Left Caucus furthered (however briefly) 
joint policy discussion.  
 Third, the TNPs do not act as fully effective force-multipliers for their national parties. 
Only the EGP is moving, after a slow start, towards a more institutionalised transnational party. 
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The largest left TNP, the PES, has certainly also become a more consolidated and strategically 
consensual organisation, but it has limited its ambitions to becoming an intergovernmental 
lynchpin. Yet, relative to these groups, the EL has the worst of all worlds, primarily because the 
intergovernmental/federal disagreements noted in the other party families are overlaid with a 
more persistent ideological/strategic divisions over the EU itself. In addition, the EL’s weaker 
links to the GUE/NGL and the party family beyond the EP are debilitating. Given that the EL is 
the party family most opposed to neo-liberalism, its own internal weaknesses cannot but weaken 
the potential for any putative anti-neo-liberal ‘front’ within the EU. 
 Finally, the increasing policy consensus is wider than it is deep. It certainly has not 
amounted to a marked increase of legislative co-operation except perhaps between the PES and 
EGP; rather, the legislative activity of the TNPs shows that ‘anti-neo-liberalism’ is rather a 
hollow shell, lacking either a generally agreed strategic component or voting prescriptions. 
Shared understandings of a post neo-liberal model remain absent. For the PES and Greens, the 
focus is on modest within-system reform and their voting positions place them as largely 
accommodationist towards the current direction of the EU. In contrast, despite the pro-European 
sentiments of the European Left party, the GUE/NGL (or at least significant elements within it) 
continues to regard anti-neo-liberalism as a proxy for anti-capitalism, and to adopt rejectionist 
positions that aim to demonstrate that the EU is structurally flawed and incapable of modest 
‘reform.’ It remains to be seen whether the lasting effects of the crisis will cause a greater shift 
towards more radical opposition to the EU’s economic model within the PES or EGP, or greater 
consensus within the GUE/NGL. Without these, a substantive, rather than just rhetorical, 
alternative to neo-liberalism may be dead in the water.  
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